(12) FEIBELMAN (DO NOT DELETE)

8/20/2012 1:33 PM

INVOLUNTARY BANKRUPTCY
FOR AMERICAN STATES
ADAM FEIBELMAN
The history [of Congress’ bankruptcy power] is one of an
expanding concept. It is, however, an expanding concept that has
had to fight its way. Almost every change has been hotly denounced
in its beginnings as a usurpation of power. Only time or judicial
1
decision has had capacity to silence opposition.

This essay began as an act of whimsy and provocation. Its central
argument—that any bankruptcy regime created for American states
should include an involuntary component—is well beyond the scope
of current discussions among legal scholars and policymakers who are
exploring the possibility of extending bankruptcy law to the States.
While various writers and policymakers have recently advocated or
2
considered allowing states to obtain relief in bankruptcy, as one
writer puts it, “no one is proposing involuntary bankruptcy for
3
states.”

 Sumter Davis Marks Professor of Corporate and Business Law, Tulane University. Thanks to
Onnig Dombalagian, Melissa Jacoby, Keith Werhan, Ernest Young, and participants in the
Duke Journal of Constitutional Law and Public Policy symposium, “The Consequences and
Constitutional Dilemmas of State Debt,” for helpful comments and conversation.
1. Ashton v. Cameron Cnty. Water Improvement Dist., 298 U.S. 513, 535 (1936)
(Cardozo, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
2. See generally, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Extending Bankruptcy Law to States: Is It
Constitutional?, in WHEN STATES GO BROKE: ORIGINS, CONTEXT, AND SOLUTIONS FOR THE
AMERICAN STATES IN FISCAL CRISIS (Peter Conti-Brown & David Skeel eds., 2012); Steven L.
Schwarcz, A Minimalist Approach to State “Bankruptcy”, 59 UCLA L. REV. 322 (2011); David
A. Skeel, Jr., States of Bankruptcy, Univ. of Pa. Law School, Public Law Research Paper No.
11–30 (2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? abstract_id=1907774; David
Solan, State Bankruptcy: Surviving a Tenth Amendment Challenge, 42 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV.
217 (2012); Lisa Lambert, State Bankruptcy Bill Imminent, Gingrich Says, REUTERS (Jan. 21,
2011, 5:57 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/21/us-usa-states-bankruptcy-idUSTRE
70K6PI20110121.
3. McConnell, supra note 2, at 229. Some writers have discussed the possibility of
involuntary bankruptcy for sovereigns. See, e.g., Patrick Bolton & David A. Skeel, Jr., Inside the
Black Box: How Should a Sovereign Bankruptcy Framework Be Structured, 53 EMORY L.J. 763,
786–87 (2004).
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Until now. And with inspiration from Justice Cardozo’s
observation quoted above, what began as whimsy and provocation has
become an argument—one that now seems more plausible than it did
at the outset of this project. As Part I explains, there is a strong
economic justification for an involuntary component of a bankruptcy
regime in general. Debtors are predictably inclined to delay or avoid
seeking available relief, thereby incurring unnecessary costs and
losses that fall upon their creditors and other stakeholders.
Governmental debtors are similar to other debtors in this regard.
Part II describes how sovereign governments—motivated by political
pressures, concerns over access to credit markets, and optimism about
economic improvements—predictably delay or avoid seeking debt
relief when they suffer financial distress. Because governments in
financial crisis can continue to collect tax revenues to fund their
obligations, and because they enjoy broad immunity from suit and
from enforcement of judgments against them, they have significant
latitude to kick the can down the road until their financial situations
become acute or resolve themselves. Meanwhile, their obligations
accumulate, diluting each other, and some of their assets may be
depleted.
Although American states have averted acute financial distress in
the modern era, Part II argues that they would likely delay seeking
relief if they were to face an unfolding financial crisis as other
governmental debtors have done. If the goal of allowing American
states to file for bankruptcy is to reduce the likelihood or the scope of
financial support from the federal government, that goal could remain
largely unrealized by an exclusively voluntary bankruptcy regime.
There is a real possibility that the benefits of allowing states to file for
bankruptcy could be slight compared to the costs that states will incur
and externalize as a result of their delay in voluntarily seeking relief.
Part III proposes that, if bankruptcy law is extended to states, the
federal government be authorized to initiate a bankruptcy case for a
state when it is likely to need financial assistance from the federal
government or is likely to impose financial costs or harms on the rest
of the nation. Once a state is involuntarily placed in the bankruptcy
system, however, no other involuntary consequences need follow.
Under the model regime described in Part III, the state would be
given the option to exit bankruptcy at its discretion after a short
period, during which time it would benefit from a stay on actions
against it. This protection would be more comprehensive than its
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immunity from suit or enforcement. If the state elected, it could utilize
the bankruptcy forum to negotiate with stakeholders and propose a
plan that, among other things, would bind holdout creditors.
An involuntary procedure would not assure that states obtain
relief sooner than they otherwise would. The federal government
might itself delay invoking the procedure, perhaps for reasons similar
to those that would deter the state from voluntarily seeking relief in
bankruptcy. Furthermore, a state forced into bankruptcy might choose
to exit without submitting a plan for restructuring if the option to exit
were available. Nonetheless, the inclusion of an involuntary procedure
in any state bankruptcy regime should at least increase the chances
that a state in financial distress would obtain bankruptcy relief and
would obtain it somewhat earlier than it otherwise would.
The commentary on extending bankruptcy protection to states
assumes, often without inquiry, that an involuntary bankruptcy
provision for states would be impermissible under the U.S.
Constitution. Two Supreme Court cases from the 1930s that examined
the constitutionality of the U.S. municipal bankruptcy regime include
dicta supporting this view. Part IV argues that constitutional
impediments to a state bankruptcy regime with an involuntary
component are much less robust than courts, commentators, and
scholars assume. A narrowly drawn bankruptcy regime for states that
could be triggered by the federal government only if a state were
likely to need financial assistance or threatened domestic financial
stability should be able to navigate constitutional doctrines of state
sovereignty. American states are not unqualifiedly sovereign, and
their sovereignty is not so expansive that it can prevent the federal
government from protecting fundamental national economic and
financial interests when a state faces financial crisis.
I. INVOLUNTARY BANKRUPTCY
Bankruptcy can serve a variety of important functions. It can
increase the overall return for creditors of an insolvent debtor and
ensure the timely and equitable allocation and recognition of losses
4
stemming from a failing debtor. Simply by halting a race to collect
assets from a debtor in financial distress, a bankruptcy regime can

4. See, e.g., World Bank, 2011 Principles for Effective Insolvency and Creditor/Debtor
Regimes, at 6 (2011), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTGILD/Resources/
ICRPrinciples_Jan2011.pdf.
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help preserve the value of the debtor’s assets for the benefit of all
5
creditors. Bankruptcy can also provide a process and a forum for
restructuring the debtor’s obligations to increase its value as a going
6
concern for the benefit of its creditors and other stakeholders.
But these functions of bankruptcy often depend on the regime
being employed in a timely fashion. The consequences of avoiding or
delaying bankruptcy when a debtor is in financial distress can be
significant and, in some cases, determinative. Financial distress is itself
7
costly to debtors and to other stakeholders. A debtor’s productivity
may decline while it is distracted by financial distress, and it will likely
incur direct costs in navigating its distress. If it defaults on obligations
or delays in payment, its creditors will shift their losses back on the
debtor if they are able, causing the debtor to suffer additional distressrelated obligations. Debtors in distress will also likely have pressing
financing needs and will generally be required to pay more for credit
than financially healthy firms. Any new costly financing will further
8
dilute existing claims. Meanwhile, the debtor may be hemorrhaging
assets in its effort to stay afloat or due to poor management.
If a private debtor’s indebtedness worsens or its assets are
depleted, the overall insolvency-state return for creditors tends to
decline. If the debtor faces liquidation, there will be less to share
among a larger group of claims. If there is initially a chance that the
debtor could be successfully reorganized, it may become significantly
more challenging to do so as the debtor slides deeper into financial
distress. It will have fewer assets to employ as a going concern and
greater short- and medium-term financing needs; it may also have
squandered commercial opportunities and goodwill that it could more
profitably exploit as a restructured entity.
Despite the costs and pitfalls of delay in the face of financial
distress, debtors are predictably inclined to avoid or delay voluntarily
seeking debt relief for some significant amount of time after it is in
their and their creditors’ interest to seek relief. Significant numbers of
individuals and households in the United States forgo substantial

5. See, e.g., Adam Feibelman, Federal Bankruptcy Law and State Sovereign Immunity, 81
TEX. L. REV. 1381, 1419–20 (2003).
6. See, e.g., World Bank, supra note 4, at 6.
7. See Adam Feibelman, Defining the Social Insurance Function of Consumer
Bankruptcy, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 129, 166 (2005) (discussing the costs of financial
distress).
8. See, e.g., Bolton & Skeel, supra note 3, at 786.
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9

relief available to them under bankruptcy law. Faltering business
debtors routinely delay seeking available relief, often needlessly
expending resources that would be useful in a reorganization or that
10
would increase the insolvency-state returns of their creditors.
There are numerous interrelated explanations for debtors’ delay
in seeking debt relief when they experience financial distress. They
may be overly optimistic about their future prospects for financial
recovery and believe that debt relief will ultimately be unnecessary.
They may be uninformed or poorly informed about the relief
available to them. They may be deterred by stigma or concerns about
reputation. Managers of a corporate debtor may reasonably fear that
they will lose their positions if their firm files for bankruptcy.
Because the inclination of debtors to delay or avoid seeking debt
relief can frustrate the primary goals of bankruptcy, most bankruptcy
regimes around the globe provide that debtors can be forced into
11
bankruptcy involuntarily in at least some circumstances. Under the
U.S. Bankruptcy Code, for example, three or more unsecured or
under-secured claimholders whose unsecured claims total more than
$14,425 can file an involuntary petition in Chapters 11 and 7 against
12
consumer and commercial debtors.

9. See generally Michelle White, Why Don’t More Households File for Bankruptcy?, 14
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 205 (1998) (noting that a “higher fraction of U.S. households would benefit
financially from bankruptcy than actually file”).
10. See, e.g., Susan Block-Lieb, Why Creditors File So Few Involuntary Petitions and Why
the Number Is Not Too Small, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 803, 835 (1991) (quoting Report of the
Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. I, at 14 (1973), reprinted in LAWRENCE P. KING ET AL., COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
APP. VOL. 2 (15th ed. 1979) (“[A] major factor explaining the smallness of distributions in
business bankruptcies is the delay in the institution of proceedings for liquidation until assets
are largely depleted.”)).
11. World Bank, supra note 4, at 16 (“Both debtors and creditors should be entitled to
apply for insolvency proceedings.”); UNCITRAL, LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON INSOLVENCY LAW
54 (2004), available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/05-80722_Ebook.pdf
(noting that most jurisdictions allow involuntary proceedings for liquidation but not all
jurisdictions allow involuntary reorganization proceedings); Segio Muro, Deciding on an
Efficient Involuntary Bankruptcy Filing Petition Rule, Cornell Law School Graduate Student
Papers, no. 6, at 23 (2003), available at http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/lps_papers/6
(“Whatever the special approach taken by the legal system, bankruptcy laws traditionally
maintain that creditors’ filings will help to bring recalcitrant, absconding or maybe just
overconfident debtors into bankruptcy.”). In fact, bankruptcy law originally was exclusively an
involuntary creditors’ remedy. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, The Initiation Problem in
Bankruptcy, 11 INT’L REV. L. ECON. 223, 225 (1991).
12. 11 U.S.C.A. § 303(b)(1) (West 2010). “[I]f there are fewer than 12 such holders . . . one
or more of such holders that hold in the aggregate at least $14,425 of such claims” can file an
involuntary petition. Id. at § 303(b)(2).
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Once an involuntary petition is filed under the Code, the debtor
13
has an opportunity to answer and controvert the petition. If the
debtor does so, the bankruptcy case can nonetheless proceed if “the
debtor is generally not paying such debtor’s debts as such debts
14
become due unless such debts are the subject of a bona fide dispute.”
If a court dismisses an involuntary petition, the petitioning creditors
can be forced to pay the debtor’s costs or attorney’s fees; if a creditor
is found to have acted in bad faith, it can be liable for any losses or
15
costs caused by their action or for punitive damages. Furthermore,
“except to the extent that the court orders otherwise, . . . any business
of the debtor may continue to operate, and the debtor may continue
to use, acquire, or dispose of property as if an involuntary case
16
concerning the debtor had not been commenced.”
In theory, the availability of involuntary bankruptcy is an
17
appealing and important component of a bankruptcy system.
Unsecured creditors as a group are in a uniquely good position to pull
the bankruptcy trigger when it is most beneficial to do so. They
generally have fewer reasons than their debtors to delay filing a
bankruptcy petition, and they have strong motivations to file an
involuntary petition if delay would waste a debtor’s assets or its
going-concern value. If a debtor becomes insolvent or nears
insolvency, then (at least some) unsecured creditors will bear the first
loss among creditors. Any diminution in the value of the debtor at
that point continues to reduce the unsecured creditors’ collective
return. On the other hand, if entering bankruptcy would be more
costly than beneficial, the unsecured creditors will likely bear those
costs. Thus, unsecured creditors as a group should internalize both the
costs and benefits of timely filing for bankruptcy more than most or

13. Id. at § 303(d). “If the petition is not timely controverted, the court shall order relief
against the debtor in an involuntary case under the chapter under which the petition was filed.”
Id. at § 303(h).
14. Id. at § 303(h)(1). An involuntary case can also proceed if “within 120 days before the
date of the filing of the petition, a custodian . . . was appointed or took possession.” Id. at
§ 303(h)(2).
15. Id. at § 303(i). A petitioning creditor can be required to post a bond “to indemnify the
debtor for such [damages] as the court may later allow.” Id. at § 303(e).
16. Id. at § 303(f).
17. There is surprisingly little commentary or scholarship on the general approach or on
specific provisions of particular bankruptcy regimes. Notable works on the topic include
THOMAS JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 193–209 (1986); Baird,
supra note 11; Block-Lieb, supra note 10; Susan Block-Lieb, Fishing in Muddy Waters:
Clarifying the Common Pool Analogy as Applied to the Standard for Commencement of a
Bankruptcy Case, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 337 (1993); Muro, supra note 11.
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all other stakeholders, including the debtor.
The foregoing suggests that creditors would exercise their power
to force commercial debtors into bankruptcy with some frequency. As
Douglas Baird has noted, “[t]his trigger is so easy for a creditor to pull
that it might seem likely that bankruptcy would begin too early rather
than too late. Only a few creditors need to get together to invoke the
18
scrutiny of the bankruptcy court and ask if the debtor has a future.”
In fact, however, involuntary bankruptcy petitions are an extremely
19
small percentage of all bankruptcy filings in the United States.
There are various explanations for this, none of which are
mutually exclusive. The requirements for filing an involuntary petition
20
may still be forbidding in some circumstances. The potential liability
for filing an involuntary petition that is subsequently dismissed may
21
also discourage some creditors. Perhaps more profoundly, if
unsecured creditors are in a good position to internalize the net
benefits of an involuntary petition, this is true of creditors in the
collective, but not individually. As Baird notes:
Ordinarily, one can depend upon the party that benefits from a
particular legal rule to invoke it. Bankruptcy is different. The
beneficiaries of bankruptcy law are the creditors as a whole, not
individual creditors within the group. One wants a bankruptcy
proceeding to begin when it is in the collective interest of the
group, but one must still depend upon someone to initiate it. One
must somehow ensure that when a bankruptcy proceeding is in the
collective interest of the creditors, it is also in someone’s individual
22
interest as well.

Thus, while all of a debtor’s creditors might benefit from forcing
the debtor into bankruptcy, they will enjoy that benefit only if three
(or fewer in certain circumstances) creditors file a petition on their
behalf. But any single creditor may not be motivated to join in doing
so: it would bear the direct and indirect costs of filing and could face
23
liability if the petition is dismissed. This is a collective action

18. Baird, supra note 11, at 224.
19. Block-Lieb, supra note 10, at 803–04 & n.6.
20. See, e.g., id. at 806 (exploring the continuing challenges for creditors under § 303);
Muro, supra note 11, at 25–29 (describing the U.S. bankruptcy regime as “debtor’s choice”
because of the challenges creditors face in forcing a debtor into bankruptcy).
21. See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki, A General Theory of the Dynamics of the State
Remedies/Bankruptcy System, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 311, 353 (1982).
22. Baird, supra note 11, at 223 (citations omitted).
23. Id. at 224.
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problem: “Because creditors largely lack the incentive to begin the
bankruptcy proceeding, American bankruptcy law depends upon
those who control the corporate debtor under nonbankruptcy law to
24
start it.”
Furthermore, creditors may not have sufficient information to
know when to force their debtors into bankruptcy. “Those best
positioned to know both the financial condition of the firm and the
likelihood that creditors will assert their nonbankruptcy default rights
are the managers of the firm. Individual creditors lack a sense of the
25
overall, day-to-day health of the firm.” Although creditors can be
effective monitors of their debtors, “[c]reditors on the whole . . . tend
26
to specialize” and may not individually have a comprehensive sense
27
of the condition of their common debtor. In any event, creditors
often do not need to utilize an involuntary bankruptcy provision to
force a debtor into bankruptcy. Creditors can do so by refusing to
forbear or provide additional financing or by taking actions to collect
28
upon obligations.
Finally, most creditors resolve issues with their debtors outside of
bankruptcy. In some cases, the parties prefer a less adversarial
approach, perhaps to preserve relationships or to maintain a
reputation for flexibility. In other cases, bankruptcy is simply
unnecessary. “[T]he nonbankruptcy world of debt collection [is] a
world in which individual creditors can threaten the survival of the
29
firm as a going concern by threatening to seize its assets.”
Taken together, these observations underscore an important point:
even when given the power to trigger a debtor’s bankruptcy, creditors
will often themselves delay or avoid forcing their debtor into
bankruptcy. This does not mean, however, that a provision for
involuntary bankruptcy has no value for commercial creditors and
their debtors. First, although they are rare, involuntary filings do
happen. In hundreds of cases in the United States each year, creditors

24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 230–31. Baird notes potential strategies to overcome this information asymmetry,
like allowing managers to keep their jobs if they file for bankruptcy at the right time or perhaps
compensating them for doing so. Id.
28. See, e.g., Block-Lieb, supra note 10, at 804 (“The line between voluntary and
involuntary filings is an ambiguous one because debtors often file voluntary petitions in reaction
to creditors’ collection efforts.”).
29. Baird, supra note 11, at 228.
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do in fact force their debtors into bankruptcy sooner than the debtor
30
would have sought relief itself. Second, there is always the chance
that creditors of a debtor in financial distress might pull the trigger,
which may motivate debtors to seek formal relief earlier. Third, and
relatedly, the availability of involuntary bankruptcy likely gives
creditors some leverage to renegotiate with the debtor to make
bankruptcy unnecessary.
II. THE PUBLIC DEBTOR
The potential benefits of exposing government debtors to
involuntary bankruptcy are similar to those of private debtors. Like
other debtors—perhaps more so—government debtors in financial
distress consistently avoid or delay taking steps to restructure their
obligations until doing so is unavoidable. In addition to the reasons
that private debtors delay or avoid seeking relief noted above,
government actors are subject to political constraints and may fear
that they will be punished at the ballot box for steering their
31
government into bankruptcy. This Part argues that, in theory, the
case for involuntary sovereign bankruptcy is strong and the case for
involuntary state bankruptcy is even stronger.
A. Sovereigns
Few American states have faced acute financial crises in the
modern era, but numerous sovereigns have done so and their
32
experiences are illuminating. Although there is no bankruptcy
regime or formal debt-restructuring mechanism available to sovereign
debtors, there is a familiar ad hoc process for sovereign debt
33
restructuring. And while dozens of sovereigns have gone through
this process in recent decades, they have consistently triggered the
process well after the time that relief would have been most
30. See, e.g., Muro, supra note 11, at 26 (quoting David S. Kennedy et al., The Involuntary
Banruptcy Process: A Study of the Relevant Statutory and Procedural Provisions and Related
Matters, 31 U. MEM. L. REV. 1, 3 (2000)).
31. Christoph Trebesch, Delays in Sovereign Debt Restructuring: Should We Really
Blame the Creditors? 3 (Mar. 25, 2008) (unpublished paper), available at
http://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/gdec08/44.html (reporting evidence “that political risk and
government behavior might be a much more important reason for restructuring delays than
creditor behavior”).
32. See generally, e.g., Adam Feibelman, American States and Sovereign Debt
Restructuring, in WHEN STATES GO BROKE: ORIGINS, CONTEXT, AND SOLUTIONS FOR THE
AMERICAN STATES IN FISCAL CRISIS (Peter Conti-Brown & David Skeel eds., 2012).
33. See id. at 158–71 (describing recent sovereign debt restructurings).
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34

beneficial. The recent experience of Greece illuminates the
foregoing points. For a variety of reasons, Greece faced fewer formal
impediments to restructuring its debt than most sovereigns in a
35
similar financial and economic position. And yet it took two years of
36
acute crisis for the country to restructure any of its obligations.
As the unfolding Greek episode reflects, governments are
uniquely able to persist with unsustainable obligations for extended
periods of time, in some cases indefinitely. Absent acute crises,
sovereigns almost always have access to some revenues that they can
use to pay creditors, even at the cost of allocating insufficient
resources to the public goods they provide. Furthermore, sovereigns
may be especially hesitant to anger private creditors for fear that they
will be excluded from credit markets in the future. They may also be
hesitant to anger private creditors’ home governments or important
37
official creditors for geopolitical reasons.
Thus, sovereign debtors trigger the process of debt restructuring
when they reach the point of acute crisis. These crises are occasioned

34. See Bolton & Skeel, supra note 3, at 786 (explaining that sovereigns tend to “default
too late”); Anna Gelpern, Bankruptcy, Backwards: The Problem of Quasi-Sovereign Debt, 121
YALE L.J. 888, 927 (2012) (“In most cases, the debt restructuring option is invoked too late in
hindsight—a problem that sovereign bankruptcy proposals have sought to solve.”); ANNE O.
KRUEGER, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, A NEW APPROACH TO SOVEREIGN DEBT
RESTRUCTURING 1 (2002), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/exrp/sdrm/eng
/sdrm.pdf (noting the “tendency for debtors to delay restructuring until the last possible
moment, increasing the likelihood that the process will be associated with substantial
uncertainty and loss of asset values, to the detriment of debtors and creditors alike”).
35. See, e.g., Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, How to Restructure Greek Debt 4–6 (May
7, 2010) (working paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1603304.
36. In early 2010, it was revealed that Greece had been disguising its financial condition,
which was much worse than markets realized. See Nelson D. Schwarz et al., Wall St. Helped to
Mask Debt Fueling Europe’s Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2010), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/14/business/global/14debt.html?pagewanted=all. This quickly
led to the onset of acute crisis and an initial rescue from the IMF and Eurozone countries. See
Press Release, International Monetary Fund, IMF Executive Board Approves $30 Billion
Stand-By Arrangement for Greece (May 9, 2010), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/
sec/pr/2010/pr10187.htm. Greece successfully restructured $206 billion in obligations in March
2012. See Richard Milne, Greek Deal Will Buy Time but Hard Work Lies Ahead, FIN. TIMES
(Mar.
7,
2012,
9:49
PM),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/226d36c4-6875-11e1-a6cc00144feabdc0.html#ax zz1q3A8hk7X.
37. See generally, Anna Gelpern, Odious, Not Debt, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 101
(2007) (observing the large portion of sovereign debt owed to official creditors and describing
the political dimensions of those financial relationships); W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Contracting
for State Intervention: The Origins of Sovereign Debt Arbitration, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
335 (2010) (exploring how arbitration clauses in sovereign debt contracts historically enabled
creditors’ home states to intervene in disputes over their private claims against sovereign
debtors).
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by some combination of familiar if harrowing circumstances: a
country’s currency collapses, its banking system freezes, there is a
flight of foreign investment, the country cannot meet payments
38
coming due, it is effectively excluded from private credit markets.
When any combination of these things happens to a sovereign, it must
generally impose losses on its creditors, obtain financial support from
39
the official sector (usually lead by the IMF), or both. By the time a
sovereign reaches this point, however, the costs of crisis are likely
greater than they would have been if the sovereign had acted earlier,
perhaps only slightly earlier.
Numerous commentators, policymakers, and market participants
have argued, therefore, that the process of sovereign debt
40
restructuring should encourage sovereigns to avoid delay. This is a
primary motivation behind a growing list of proposals for a sovereign
bankruptcy regime or debt-restructuring mechanism. The literature
on sovereign bankruptcy has not satisfactorily addressed, however,
how a formal mechanism would actually prod sovereigns to seek
relief earlier than they do under the current ad hoc approach. Other
than making the process of debt relief more manageable and
predictable, proposals do not include any measures that would
directly alter sovereigns’ incentives to delay and avoid reckoning. And
the goal of making sovereign debt restructuring easier and more
manageable is hardly uncontroversial. Making it easier for sovereigns
41
to obtain debt relief earlier may exacerbate moral hazard.
Although sovereign nations are not likely to accede to any
international agreement allowing for involuntary sovereign
bankruptcy, at least some writers have observed that an involuntary
42
procedure for sovereigns could be beneficial. It could provide a
mechanism for stemming the costs and losses caused by sovereign
debt crises, and it might also reduce the incentives that governments
have to accumulate unsustainable obligations in the first place.

38. See, e.g., Feibelman, supra note 32, at 156–57.
39. See, e.g., id. at 169.
40. See generally, e.g., Gelpern, supra note 34.
41. See, e.g., Feibelman, supra note 32, at 184–85; Steven L. Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt
Restructuring: A Bankruptcy Reorganization Approach, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 101, 130–31 (2002)
(discussing moral hazard effects of bankruptcy protection).
42. See, e.g., Bolton & Skeel, supra note 3, at 786–87 (describing “the greater merit in
recommending involuntary bankruptcy than is often appreciated”).
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The theoretical case for involuntary sovereign bankruptcy may be
especially strong for sovereigns that are members of a monetary
union. Again, as the situation in Europe illustrates, members of a
monetary union have a strong interest in ensuring that every member
avoid financial distress and that they stem financial woes before a
crisis materializes. The costs of a member’s financial crisis will likely
be externalized upon the union, and those costs could be magnified
within and beyond the union through formal financial linkages and
contagion. A union-level involuntary bankruptcy mechanism could
give union members a way to protect themselves from this
vulnerability, although it is entirely possible that other union members
and union institutions might themselves delay forcing a member of
43
the union into debt relief. Recent reforms of the Euro zone’s
Growth and Stability Pact can be understood as attempting to address
44
this vulnerability ex ante.
B. States
Recent financial and economic conditions have raised the specter
of one or more American states experiencing some form of financial
45
distress. If that occurred, it would presumably impose external costs
and losses on other states and on the federal government, much like a
member of a monetary union externalizes costs and losses upon the
46
union. And like sovereigns in monetary unions, those costs and
47
losses may be magnified due to systemic linkages and to contagion.
A state in crisis that delays obtaining debt relief would
presumably impose even greater costs and losses on other states and

43. This is especially true if a bankruptcy or restructuring might impose direct, immediate
costs or externalities across the union. Union members may at least be inclined to act earlier
than a sovereign would act voluntarily, however, and seeking relief even slightly earlier may
make a significant difference in this context.
44. See, e.g., Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and
Monetary Union (Jan. 1, 2012), available at http://www.european-council.europa.eu/media/
579087/treaty.pdf.
45. See, e.g., Skeel, supra note 2, at 2 (“In the past several years, however, the possibility of
a state default has begun to look a little less imaginary.”); Schwarcz, supra note 2, at 324
(“There is a rising consensus, however, that these measures will not be enough, and that states
will also need debt relief.”).
46. See, e.g., Skeel, supra note 2, at 21–22 (discussing the possibility of a federal bailout of
a state in financial distress and describing the alternative of state default as “the financial
equivalent of a tsunami”).
47. See Schwarcz, supra note 2, at 324 (“[I]f a default by one state undermines investor
confidence in all state debt, the broader market in that debt might collapse.”); Gelpern, supra
note 34, at 911 (noting that a state default is “likely to be systemically disruptive”).
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on the federal government than if it sought relief earlier. And there
are good reasons to believe that American states would in fact delay
or avoid seeking debt relief as sovereign debtors have historically
done—perhaps more so. Compared to sovereigns, financially
embattled American states might be more able to avoid seeking relief
or addressing underlying financial weaknesses in financial distress
48
because states are less vulnerable to acute financial crises. States
49
tend to be more constrained in their ability incur debt. They also
borrow in dollars, so they are not subject to exchange-rate crises.
Furthermore, because they are not directly responsible for the
stability of the banking system, states are not directly and
independently exposed to the threat of a banking crisis. States may
also enjoy stronger immunity from suits by creditors, if only because
they generally do not waive immunity as sovereigns tend to do, and
50
this may give them more room to maneuver to avoid an acute crisis.
If states in financial distress do delay seeking bankruptcy relief,
they would likely undermine the utility of bankruptcy law in helping
to avoid or reduce their need for bailouts from the federal
government, a primary goal of extending bankruptcy protection to
51
states. Bankruptcy might be more effective than ad hoc restructuring
in a moment of crisis, but a state that delayed in seeking relief could
thereby incur costs that would offset any benefit gained from allowing
it to seek relief in bankruptcy in the first place. Furthermore, the
availability of a bankruptcy backstop itself might actually make states
more comfortable in delaying any effort to restructure their
obligations until the need to do so becomes unavoidable. Thus, a
purely voluntary bankruptcy scheme for states may fail to achieve its
aims and could actually do more harm than good.
The practical challenges of creating a state bankruptcy regime
with an involuntary component may also be less forbidding than the
challenges of creating a similar regime for sovereigns. It would likely
be easier to design a state bankruptcy regime with an involuntary
component than it would be to create one for sovereigns. The

48. See, e.g., Feibelman, supra note 32, at 152–56.
49. See, e.g., id. at 152–53.
50. See, e.g., id. at 152.
51. See, e.g., Schwarcz, supra note 2, at 325; David Skeel, Testimony Before the Subcomm.
on TARP, Fin. Servs. and Bailouts of Pub. and Private Programs, Comm. on Oversight and
Gov’t Reform, 112th Cong. (2011) (“We need a fire department for state fiscal crises that does
not depend on using a major federal bailout as a backstop.”).
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underlying state bankruptcy regime could be created through
52
amendments to the existing Chapter 9 and could utilize the existing
U.S. bankruptcy court infrastructure. Nonetheless, the political
obstacles to state bankruptcy in general, and especially state
bankruptcy with an involuntary component, may be insurmountable.
III. DESIGN
This Part addresses, in very general terms, some of the most
important issues concerning the design of an involuntary provision in
a bankruptcy scheme for states. It proposes a model for involuntary
state bankruptcy under which the federal government has the
authority to force a state into bankruptcy if the state threatens
national financial or economic interests; a state forced into
bankruptcy could be given the option to exit bankruptcy after a brief
period; the state would enjoy a broad stay of actions against it while in
bankruptcy; and it would have the opportunity to propose a
restructuring plan that could bind holdout creditors. Thus, entry would
be the only involuntary aspect of the regime. To be clear, although this
Part proposes some design choices, the discussion below is only
intended to sketch a plausible version of involuntary state bankruptcy
and thereby make the general idea somewhat harder to dismiss.
A. Who triggers?
If policymakers were interested in adopting an involuntary
bankruptcy procedure for government debtors, they would need to
address some unique questions of design. While the procedure might
be adapted from existing provisions allowing for involuntary
bankruptcy, it would presumably reflect some fundamental
differences in the nature of commercial and government debtors.
Most notably, whereas creditors are relatively well-suited to trigger a
private debtor’s bankruptcy proceeding, the federal government is the
only entity that could plausibly force a state into bankruptcy.
For numerous reasons, creditors of a state are not in a good
position to trigger their debtor’s involuntary bankruptcy. As an initial
matter, like creditors of private firms, individual creditors of a state
may not have sufficient incentives to bear the full costs of forcing the
state into bankruptcy. Furthermore, creditors of a state may be less
likely than creditors of private firms to collectively internalize the
52. See, e.g., Feibelman, supra note 32, at 185.
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costs and benefits of forcing the state into bankruptcy. Governments
(like consumers, to some extent) cannot face liquidation and they
53
generally repay their creditors from revenues. If they delay seeking
debt relief, states may deplete some assets that creditors might share
upon liquidation, but that risk is probably not as great as it is for
creditors of private firms. If not, that removes an opportunity for
creditors to increase their insolvency-state returns by forcing the state
into bankruptcy earlier than it would enter bankruptcy voluntarily.
Relatedly, a government’s creditors may be more likely than
creditors of private firms to share their debtor’s preference for
delaying or avoiding debt restructuring, even in the face of financial
distress. Because their government debtor does not face liquidation,
and because it may persist with unsustainable levels of indebtedness
for a long time, they may have better reason to hope that they will
eventually get repaid in full after a present crisis subsides. This is
especially true if they expect to take a loss in a debt-restructuring
process.
Even more than with consumer debtors, the prospect of a
government being forced into bankruptcy raises concerns about
dignity, autonomy, and sovereignty. It is a nearly universal principle
that private interests are not allowed to direct matters affecting public
54
policy. After all, private actors are politically unaccountable and they
are not in a position to balance the interests that a governmental unit
55
must serve. This helps explain why states enjoy robust sovereign
immunity from actions of private parties that may affect the state’s
56
fiscal or governmental policies. Being forced into a bankruptcy
proceeding would represent a meaningful interference with
government policy and, potentially, its financial condition. Increasing
private creditors’ insolvency returns is probably not a sufficient

53. See, e.g., Gelpern, supra note 34, at 926 (“With most sovereign assets inaccessible to
creditors, as a practical matter, claims against sovereigns are paid as they come due from the
debtor’s primary budget surplus.”). But see, Skeel, supra note 2, at 6–7 (noting that states often
sell assets to pay creditors when they experience financial distress). In general, the primary risk
that creditors of sovereign debtors face is that the debtor will continue to borrow, diluting the
value of existing claims. See Bolton & Skeel, supra note 3, at 788–92.
54. The exceptions to this principle (e.g., industry self-regulation), which are carefully
circumscribed and still controversial, tend to prove the general rule.
55. See Gelpern, supra note 34, at 909–10 (describing American states’ “residual
responsibility for the welfare of their citizens”); Feibelman, supra note 32, at 150 (discussing the
role of government in providing public goods).
56. See, e.g., Emily D. Johnson & Ernest A. Young, The Constitutional Law of State Debt,
DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 117 (2012).
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justification for granting private creditors the authority to force a
state government into bankruptcy.
The federal government is in a much better position to trigger a
state’s involuntary bankruptcy. Because state governments serve
crucial functions and cannot be liquidated, they will ultimately be
rescued, bailed out, or protected if all else fails, and the federal
government will fund and coordinate any necessary rescue on behalf
of the nation and other states. And before any rescue or bailout
becomes necessary, a state that experiences financial distress will
likely externalize many costs upon the nation. In fact, because the
federal government does not have the ability to force a state to seek
57
debt relief, states are currently subject to a serious moral hazard. If
they believe that the federal government will bail them out if they get
into a deep enough hole, they may not try as hard to take the difficult
actions necessary to avoid financial distress.
As a result of this structural financial relationship, the federal
government would internalize many of the benefits and the costs of
forcing a state into bankruptcy if the state is in or approaching serious
58
financial distress. Most obviously, it would enjoy the benefits of the
state seeking early bankruptcy relief by reducing the scope—and
perhaps the likelihood—of financial support needed from the
national government. In other words, the ability to force a state into
bankruptcy could, in theory, reduce or eliminate costs to federal
taxpayers of a bailout. Perhaps more importantly, if a state’s financial
distress began to spillover and increase risk of financial distress for
other states or for the nation, the federal government would have a
useful tool to address the emerging risk. And unlike dispersed private
creditors, the federal government would not face a collective action
problem in obtaining these benefits.
The federal government would also have to internalize various
financial and political costs of triggering a state’s bankruptcy. If the
federal government acted too precipitously in forcing a state into
bankruptcy, for example, it could impose costs on the state that it

57. See, e.g., Schwarcz, supra note 2, at 325; Skeel, supra note 2, at 27.
58. For sovereigns in a monetary or currency union, other countries in the union and
union institutions like a central bank should be in a similar position. For other sovereign
nations, international financial institutions—especially the IMF—as well as other countries that
likely would take on responsibility for rescuing the government (even if they are not its major
creditors) might be able to internalize the costs and benefits of forcing a nation to undergo debt
restructuring.
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would not otherwise have borne. This could actually hasten a federal
bailout and increase the scope of needed support. Even if an
involuntary state bankruptcy successfully stabilized the state itself and
reduced the federal government’s exposure to the state’s financial
predicament, it could undermine market confidence in other states or
the national government.
Forcing a state into bankruptcy could also be politically risky for
federal officials. It would be a highly salient, dramatic, and
controversial act, even if it were taken in the context of a state’s acute
financial distress. It would inevitably raise widespread concerns about
the legitimacy of the federal role. Setting aside the federalism
concerns, an involuntary state bankruptcy could be very unpopular
among voters if it causes immediate negative financial and economic
effects within the state or beyond. And there would probably not be
any short-term political upside for federal officials who forced a state
into bankruptcy.
As discussed below, such political concerns might cause federal
officials to delay forcing a state into bankruptcy after the point that
doing so is appropriate, undermining the purpose of an involuntary
component. Thus, although some political concerns will inevitably
affect the calculus, the process of deciding whether to force a state
into bankruptcy should be insulated from politics to the greatest
extent possible. Congress or the Executive might create a dedicated
position or entity to exercise this authority. The position could be
standing or temporary. Perhaps this authority could be vested in the
59
newly created Financial Stability Oversight Council, the systemic
stability regulator created by the Dodd-Frank Act to monitor the
stability of the financial system. Its voting members include the heads
60
of the major federal financial regulators. The composition of the
voting membership of the Council and the importance of the role of
avoiding systemic crises should give the Council some measure of
authority and independence from political considerations. But the
extent of that authority and independence remains to be seen.
Thus, assuming that the decision to force a state into bankruptcy
could be at least partially insulated from direct political

59. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
60. Id. at § 111. Non-voting members include representative state financial regulators. Id.
at § 111(b)(2).
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considerations, the federal government is uniquely situated to trigger
an involuntary bankruptcy of an American state in financial distress.
It is in as good a position as any actor (including the state itself) to
trigger a state’s bankruptcy if the overall benefits of doing so are
greater than the overall costs. In theory, if given the authority, federal
officials would only force a state into bankruptcy if they thought they
could thereby stem the state’s financial deterioration (and thus reduce
the federal government’s financial exposure to the state) and if they
thought this benefit would outweigh the various political and financial
costs to the state and to the nation.
Given the salient costs and controversy that would surround a
decision to force a state into bankruptcy, the federal government
might avoid exercising its authority and, in any event, would probably
delay forcing a state to file for bankruptcy for some period beyond
the point that bankruptcy would be beneficial. Even with such
predictable delay, however, if the federal government forced a state’s
hand before the state itself would seek relief, then the involuntary
trigger could be a valuable policy option. Furthermore, the
involuntary option could be valuable even if not exercised if it
strengthened the federal government’s hand in persuading a state to
take actions—perhaps filing for bankruptcy voluntarily or
aggressively negotiating with creditors and other stakeholders—that
the state would otherwise be hesitant to take.
To press the point further (and to generalize beyond the
American context), it is structurally untenable for a government to be
ultimately responsible for, or unavoidably subject to, the financial
position of its subunits and yet have no way to discipline the financial
behavior of those subunits. This is reflected in the fact, for example,
that some American states have provided a mechanism by which they
can force their municipalities and other subunits into receivership or
61
something similar. Otherwise, states would face responsibility for
liabilities incurred by their municipalities and have no way to steer
their subunits into a restructuring process. As the European
experience now illustrates, federal schemes and monetary unions are
vulnerable to the extent that they are unable to discipline members’
financial affairs ex ante and have limited ability to force subunits to

61. See, e.g., Municipalities Financial Recovery Act, 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 11701
(West 2011); Skeel, supra note 2, at 41–42.
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62

seek debt relief ex post.
To be sure, federal- or union-level government actors will have
some leverage over a state or sovereign facing distress even if they
have no formal power to force action. When financial support or
rescue becomes necessary, for example, the government can condition
support on actions that it wants the subunit in question to undertake.
This is precisely how many reluctant sovereigns are motivated to seek
debt relief under the current ad hoc approach to sovereign debt
restructuring: an official financial supporter, most often the IMF,
essentially conditions financial support on the sovereign debtor
63
obtaining debt relief from private creditors.
Again, the current European crisis provides a case in point,
though perhaps it also represents a counterpoint. Germany and other
members of the European Monetary Union have expressly
conditioned their support for Greece on it obtaining relief from its
64
private creditors. And these countries have ratcheted up the amount
65
of “private involvement” they think is necessary. In some ways, then,
union-level actors and other members of the union may have nudged
Greece toward more aggressive debt relief. At the same time,
however, union-level institutions, the European Central Bank in
particular, also appear to have resisted some aggressive approaches to
66
debt restructuring.

62. As a dramatic reflection of this, German officials recently proposed that an E.U.
commission have the power to veto Greek budgetary expenditures. See, e.g., Peter Spiegel and
Kerin Hope, Call for EU to Control Greek Budget, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2012, 9:20 PM),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/33ab91f0-4913-11e1-88f0-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1p6hPFBAt.
63. See, e.g., Feibelman, supra note 32, at 169; Gelpern, supra note 34, at 940; see also infra
note 74.
64. See, e.g., Andrea Thomas, Germany’s Merkel Satisfied with Greek PSI Participation,
WALL ST. J. (Mar. 9, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20120309-705803.html.
65. See Jan Strupczewski, New Greek PSI Haircut Around 30–50 Percent, REUTERS (Oct.
12, 2011, 6:49 PM), available at http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/10/12/uk-eurozone-greecehaircut-idUKTRE79B3HE20111012 (noting that the expected haircut on Greek debt had
increased from 21% to 30–50%); Agustino Fontevecchia, Greek Debt Deal Will Force
Bondholders To Take ‘Voluntary’ 70% Haircut, FORBES (Jan. 23, 2012, 5:22 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/afontevecchia/2012/01/23/greek-debt-deal-will-force-bondholders-to
-take-voluntary-70-haircut/ (reporting the haircut on Greek debt as approaching seventy
percent).
66. It is possible, for example, that the European Central Bank’s reluctance for Greece to
undertake an aggressive approach to debt restructuring delayed that country’s efforts to seek
meaningful debt relief. See Joseph Stiglitz, Capturing the ECB, PROJECT SYNDICATE (Feb. 6,
2012), http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/capturing-the-ecb (pointing out a number
of ways in which the ECB resisted a more aggressive effort to restructure Greek debt).
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B. When?
Assuming that some arm of the federal government will have
authority to trigger an involuntary bankruptcy provision for states,
eligibility will present another threshold challenge. Under what
circumstances should a state be subject to involuntary bankruptcy? At
the broadest level of generality, eligibility should be a function of the
degree of a state’s financial distress. The case for involuntary
bankruptcy is strongest when it appears likely that the federal
government will have to provide substantial or extraordinary financial
support to the state. It is also at that point that the federal
government will have the most direct stake in forcing the state to
resolve its financial distress.
There are a variety of ways to design a test that would help
determine when these substantive criteria are met, none of which are
ideal. The U.S. Bankruptcy Code provides, for example, that failure to
pay debts as they come due is part of the eligibility criteria for
67
involuntary bankruptcy of private debtors. Such a failure can
certainly reflect financial distress, but it should probably not be a
necessary component of eligibility for government debtors. Given
their taxing power, governments can often avoid defaulting on
particular obligations even while they are experiencing financial
68
distress.
Perhaps eligibility for involuntary state bankruptcy could hinge on
solvency: a state could be subject to involuntary bankruptcy if it
became insolvent, a traditional standard for involuntary bankruptcy
69
or insolvency proceedings. But insolvency is a debatable basis for
70
involuntary bankruptcy in general, and it is especially imperfect for
government debtors. On the one hand, for example, acute liquidity
constraints could require the rescue of a solvent government debtor.
On the other hand, a government debtor could have an unsustainable
level of debt by some metric but survive indefinitely without the need
for financial rescue. Furthermore, insolvency is a notoriously inapt
67. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
68. See supra Part II.A. and accompanying text.
69. See Block-Lieb, supra note 17, at 367 (noting that under pre-1978 bankruptcy law in
the United States it was presumed that only an insolvent party could be subject to involuntary
bankruptcy).
70. See id. at 374–408 (criticizing insolvency as a standard and discussing JACKSON, supra
note 17); see also McConnell, supra note 2, at 235 (suggesting that giving a bankruptcy court the
authority to determine whether a state is insolvent might give it some power over the state’s
sovereign ability to conduct fiscal affairs).
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concept for governmental debtors, and questions of solvency in this
context are more accurately cast in terms of the relative sustainability
of a government’s obligations. If sustainability is a better conceptual
framework for assessing a government’s financial condition, however,
71
it is still very difficult to measure.
Given the functional weakness of available metrics or proxies, it
may be best to simply articulate the test for eligibility for involuntary
bankruptcy as “likely to need extraordinary financial assistance from
the federal government or to threaten stability of the national
economy.” This would at least underscore the primary justifications
for allowing the federal government to force a state into bankruptcy
and might focus the inquiry on those justifications. As a practical
72
matter, because the question is not likely to be litigated, whichever
actor is given authority to force a state into bankruptcy will have
significant discretion to determine when to do so. Given the stakes of
triggering an involuntary state bankruptcy, that authority would not
be exercised lightly; if it were ever exercised, there would probably
not be much question about whether the standard is met. For reasons
noted above, there may be greater reason to worry that the federal
government would delay in triggering a state bankruptcy beyond
when it should do so than there is reason to worry that it would act
precipitously.
Anticipating the constitutional concerns discussed below, it might
be desirable to grant states the option to exit bankruptcy after a short
period of time if the involuntary trigger is employed. This would
certainly blunt the involuntary nature of the scheme, and it might also
make the involuntary component less controversial in practice. One
might assume that any state forced into bankruptcy would decide to
exit as soon as it were given the opportunity. There are reasons to
believe, however, that officials and citizens of a state in financial
distress would quietly or grudgingly approve of being involuntarily
subject to bankruptcy, even if they might publicly complain. If states,
like other debtors, delay seeking beneficial debt relief until they have
no other choice, they may be grateful that someone else has the
ability to force the issue at an earlier point in their crisis.

71. See, e.g., Adam Feibelman, Contract, Priority, and Odious Debt, 85 N.C. L. REV. 727,
734 n.25 (2007); see also Gelpern, supra note 34, at 926–27 (discussing debates over debt
sustainability and noting the lack of a solvency metric for sovereigns).
72. See infra note 74.
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In that case, the state officials would not bear responsibility for
pulling the trigger, but the state would obtain the benefits of
bankruptcy law in stemming its financial distress and, especially, in
enabling it to restructure obligations that might be harder to
73
restructure outside of bankruptcy. Thus, a state forced into
bankruptcy might not exercise the discretion to exit; perhaps it would
rarely do so. Furthermore, if a state were inclined to exit bankruptcy,
and if the federal government deemed a successful restructuring
important enough, the federal government might condition federal
bailout support on the state’s remaining in bankruptcy and seeking
74
relief thereunder.
C. Automatic Stay
Even if a state did exit bankruptcy after, say, a week or two (if the
option is available), it might still benefit substantially from its brief,
involuntary sojourn in bankruptcy. Bankruptcy law generally provides
some form of injunction against nearly all collection efforts and other
actions against the debtor upon the initiation of the bankruptcy
75
proceedings. A stay on creditor actions gives the debtor some
breathing room, usually in the wake of a period of crisis or near crisis.
This respite may enable the debtor to act more deliberately in
addressing its financial circumstances. Significant for present
purposes, the stay can also force creditors, debtors, and other
stakeholders to reassess their respective financial relationships and to
recognize the extent of their interrelated fates, which can in turn
facilitate negotiated restructuring or settlement. If states and their
73. See Skeel, supra note 2, at 9–22 (describing the specific benefits of restructuring state
debt in bankruptcy).
74. In fact, it is possible that the federal government would have power enough under the
Spending Clause to insist that a state voluntarily file for bankruptcy if that were made available.
This approach would serve most of the same functions as an involuntary bankruptcy provision.
But it would likely be somewhat more constraining—the federal government would presumably
have to put money on the table first and then hope that the state needed the offered funds
enough to comply. An involuntary bankruptcy approach allows the federal government to
withhold a formal offer of financial support until the state is already in the bankruptcy process.
The federal government might be able to use its spending power to force a state to make some
efforts to restructure obligations outside of bankruptcy. See, e.g., Gelpern, supra note 34, at 940.
But if the state is attempting to restructure claims outside of bankruptcy, it may run afoul of the
Contract Clause. It is worth noting that the Supreme Court is currently considering the scope of
the federal government’s spending power in its review of the constitutionality of the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010. See generally U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human
Servs. v. Florida, No. 11-398 (U.S. argued Mar. 26, 2012).
75. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C.A. § 362 (West 2011) (including the automatic stay provision of U.S.
bankruptcy law).
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counterparties can successfully negotiate to restructure the state’s
obligations in the initial period of an involuntary bankruptcy, this
would make the other machinery of a bankruptcy unnecessary.
Consistent with existing U.S. bankruptcy law, the stay should not
impair or interfere with any exercise of governmental police or
regulatory power. Beyond this limitation, however, any stay or
injunction should be more extensive than a state’s constitutional
immunity from suit. Some commentators have proposed that states’
76
immunity may eliminate the need for a stay in bankruptcy, but
77
immunity is subject to various exceptions. Most notably, states can
waive immunity ex ante and claimants may be able to proceed under
78
Ex parte Young for injunctive relief. Furthermore, unlike an
automatic stay, immunity does not sanction a party for bringing suit or
taking other actions to try to collect an obligation, and such actions
can be detrimental to a restructuring process even if they are likely to
fail on the merits.
For similar reasons, a state’s waiver of immunity from suit should
not be construed as a waiver of the stay. Again, a bankruptcy stay is
designed to halt even those actions that creditors and other
stakeholders are entitled to take outside of bankruptcy. Unlike
private debtors, however, a state might be allowed to consent to
particular collection efforts after it is forced into bankruptcy,
especially if an exception to the stay protected the state’s police or
79
regulatory interests.
D. Plan
The inclusion of an involuntary trigger in a state bankruptcy
regime might influence the design of the bankruptcy machinery that
would apply to states in general. The possibility that a state might
enter bankruptcy involuntarily, even if it has the unqualified
discretion to exit, might provide some reason to design a state
bankruptcy regime that is unobtrusive and otherwise as voluntary as
possible (if only to make discretionary exit less likely). Procedurally,

76. See, e.g., Schwarcz, supra note 2, at 326; Gelpern, supra note 34, at 902–05.
77. See, e.g., Johnson & Young, supra note 56.
78. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
79. Under U.S. bankruptcy law, debtors are not allowed to waive the automatic stay. See
Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking Freedom of Contract: A Bankruptcy Paradigm, 77 TEX. L. REV.
515, 524–34 (1999) (discussing doctrinal and scholarly debates over the enforcement of
contracting with respect to bankruptcy, especially agreements to waiving the automatic stay).
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the regime could be as skeletal as an automatic stay and a forum in
which the state can voluntarily negotiate with counterparties. A state
might have the authority, but not be required, to submit a plan of
restructuring. The plan could provide for impairing claims against the
state, presumably with the consent of some percentage of creditors
80
and perhaps with judicial review for fair treatment.
Even if it were not required to do so, there are reasons to believe
a state would take the opportunity to submit a restructuring plan once
it had been forced into bankruptcy. First, the state may then have a
significant amount of leverage over creditors and other stakeholders
who are subject to the bankruptcy stay and who now fully realize the
extent of the state’s financial challenges. Second, the opportunity to
submit a plan of restructuring would likely allow the state to
restructure obligations in bankruptcy that would be harder to
81
restructure outside of bankruptcy. This is because, among other
things, a restructuring of claims against a state under federal
82
bankruptcy law would likely not violate the Contract Clause, while
actions by the state itself outside of bankruptcy might do so.
E. Summary
If a bankruptcy regime for states includes an involuntary
component, the involuntary trigger should only be given to officials of
the federal government, perhaps the Financial Stability Oversight
Council. The federal government should have the authority to force a
state into bankruptcy only if there is a reasonable chance that the
state will need financial support from the federal government or if the
state’s financial crisis threatens the stability of the national economy.
The federal government might delay in forcing a state into
bankruptcy, but there is at least some reason to believe that it would
pull the trigger sooner than the state. Even if it would not do so, the
threat that it might pull the trigger could encourage the state to act
sooner than it otherwise might. A state forced into bankruptcy could
be given the discretion to exit after a short period of time, during
which it would benefit from a stay on all proceedings against it. The

80. This is similar to Steven Schwarcz’s proposal for a “minimalist” state bankruptcy
regime. See generally Schwarcz, supra note 2. His model, which would be a free-standing
bankruptcy regime for states, would provide for “across-the-board supermajority voting” among
creditors that could bind holdouts. See id. at 331.
81. See supra notes 74–75 and accompanying text.
82. See, e.g., Skeel, supra note 2, at 24; McConnell, supra note 2, at 234–35.
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bankruptcy regime should provide an opportunity for a state to
voluntarily propose a plan of restructuring, which, if confirmed, could
impair claims against it pursuant to federal law.
Again, the model of involuntary state bankruptcy proposed above
is premised on an assumption that, in some circumstances, state
officials would not themselves pull the bankruptcy trigger when it
would be most beneficial to do so, even when they may want to take
advantage of procedural and substantive features of federal
bankruptcy law. State officials in such circumstances might exercise
the option to exit if forced into bankruptcy. Yet they might complain
loudly and then employ the mechanism for obtaining debt relief that
federal bankruptcy would afford.
IV. IS IT CONSTITUTIONAL?
This essay has deferred addressing the constitutional issues posed
by involuntary bankruptcy for states until this final Part for three
reasons. First, it is hopefully useful to have described a particular
model of involuntary bankruptcy against which to weigh
constitutional concerns. Second, addressing these constitutional issues
is only a secondary goal of this essay, which is primarily concerned
with evaluating the potential benefits of involuntary state bankruptcy.
And third, the analysis of these issues below is tentative and modest.
This Part does not argue confidently that an involuntary bankruptcy
provision for states would be constitutional. Rather, it argues, contra
to nearly universal consensus, that such a provision would not be
obviously unconstitutional and that the question is closer than courts
and commentators appear to assume.
Thus far, the emerging literature on state bankruptcy includes
debate over whether extending a voluntary bankruptcy regime to
83
states would violate the Constitution. Writers on both sides of the
debate limit discussion to a voluntary regime, with proponents
arguing confidently that allowing states to voluntarily file for
84
bankruptcy should pass constitutional muster. To date, skeptics of
85
this claim are somewhat muted, and thus the weight of commentary
seems to lean toward finding a voluntary state bankruptcy regime

83. See generally, e.g., McConnell, supra note 2; Skeel, supra note 2; Solan, supra note 2.
84. See, e.g., Skeel, supra note 2, at 23–25.
85. See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 2, at 236 (arguing that the answer to whether a state
bankruptcy regime would be constitutional “is not obvious either way”).
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constitutional. Proponents and skeptics alike avoid discussion of an
involuntary regime, strongly suggesting that they believe such a
regime would be unconstitutional. And, as discussed below, this view
has support in dicta from relevant Supreme Court authority.
This nearly universal view of the constitutionality of involuntary
state bankruptcy has not yet been directly and carefully examined,
however. This Part proposes that the U.S. Constitution can
accommodate a carefully drawn statute that allows the federal
government to force a state into a bankruptcy regime that is voluntary
in all other respects if a bailout or national financial crisis is eminent.
As explained below, the sovereignty of states as reflected in the Tenth
86
Amendment represents the primary obstacle to this proposition.
The Tenth Amendment of the Constitution provides: “The powers
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited
by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
87
88
people.” The Amendment has famously been described as a truism.
But the scope and meaning of this provision has shifted significantly
throughout history. This Part assesses involuntary bankruptcy for
states in light of three strands of Tenth Amendment doctrine: cases
analyzing the constitutionality of the U.S. municipal bankruptcy
regime, cases prohibiting the commandeering of state regulation, and
cases articulating a general principle of state sovereignty.
A. Municipal Bankruptcy Cases
Recent analysis of the constitutionality of state bankruptcy rightly
focuses on a pair of Supreme Court opinions from the middle of the
last century concerning the constitutionality of allowing
89
municipalities to obtain relief under federal bankruptcy law. The first
of these cases, Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement
90
91
District, struck down an initial municipal bankruptcy regime. It held
that the regime, which allowed municipalities to voluntarily file for
92
bankruptcy if state law permitted, violated the Contract Clause and

86. This essay assumes that an involuntary state bankruptcy regime triggered by the
federal government would not violate the Eleventh Amendment, which does not prohibit
actions against a state by the federal government. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
87. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
88. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).
89. See generally, e.g., Skeel, supra note 2; McConnell, supra note 2.
90. 298 U.S. 513 (1936).
91. Id. at 532.
92. “The Constitution was careful to provide that ‘no State shall . . . pass any . . . Law
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93

the Tenth Amendment. Regarding the latter, without much
explanation, the Court found that “application of the statutory
provisions now before us might materially restrict [a state’s] control
94
over its fiscal affairs.” In dicta the Court stated: “If federal
bankruptcy laws can be extended to respondent, why not to the state?
If voluntary proceedings may be permitted, so may involuntary
95
ones . . . .” Assuming (without deciding) that involuntary bankruptcy
would be impermissible, the Court thus reasoned that the voluntary
regime was unconstitutional.
Dissenting in Ashton, Justice Cardozo argued that impairment of
contracts under federal law, even if assented to by the states, does not
96
impinge the Contract Clause. He also argued that the statute in
question was “framed with sedulous regard to the structure of the
federal system,” emphasizing the voluntary nature of the provision
97
and the deference to state authorization. Responding to the
majority’s conflating voluntary and involuntary regimes, he wrote:
The question is not here whether the statute would be valid if it
made provision for involuntary bankruptcy, dispensing with the
consent of the state and with that of the bankrupt subdivision. For
present purposes, one may assume that there would be in such
conditions a dislocation of that balance between the powers of the
states and the powers of the central government which is essential
98
to our federal system.

impairing the Obligation of Contracts.’ This she may not do under the form of a
bankruptcy act or otherwise. Nor do we think she can accomplish the same end by granting
any permission necessary to enable Congress so to do.” Id. at 531 (citation omitted).
93. “Neither consent nor submission by the states can enlarge the powers of
Congress; none can exist except those which are granted. The sovereignty of the state
essential to its proper functioning under the Federal Constitution cannot be surrendered; it
cannot be taken away by any form of legislation. Like any sovereignty, a state may
voluntarily consent to be sued . . . . But nothing in this tends to support the view that the
federal government, acting under the bankruptcy clause, may impose its will and impair
state powers—pass laws inconsistent with the idea of sovereignty.” Id. (citation omitted).
94. Id. at 530.
95. Id. Interestingly, there is now a growing consensus that the first of these statements is
actually correct, whereas the latter is not given serious consideration.
96. Id. at 542 (Cardozo, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 538.
98. Id. “Sufficient reasons do not appear for excluding political subdivisions from the
bankruptcy jurisdiction if the jurisdiction is so exerted as to maintain the equilibrium between
state and national power.” Id. at 540.
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While Cardozo assumed “for present purposes” that an
involuntary provision would be unconstitutional, however, it is not
clear whether he was confident that involuntary bankruptcy (or
voluntary state bankruptcy, for that matter) would in fact create an
improper balance between the states and the federal government.
After Ashton, Congress amended the municipal bankruptcy
regime to provide explicitly that a bankruptcy court could not
interfere with the fiscal affairs of any governmental unit that filed for
99
100
bankruptcy. The new regime was upheld in United States v. Bekins.
The Court found that:
The statute is carefully drawn so as not to impinge upon the
sovereignty of the State. The State retains control of its fiscal
affairs. The bankruptcy power is exercised in relation to a matter
normally within its province, and only in a case where the action of
the taxing agency in carrying out a plan of composition approved
101
by the bankruptcy court is authorized by state law.

Again, the Court leaned heavily on the voluntary nature of the
102
municipal bankruptcy regime. But again, any suggestion in that case
that an involuntary regime would be unconstitutional is at most dicta.
The basic principle one can derive from Ashton and Bekins is that
there is a constitutional limit on the scope of any bankruptcy regime
that extends to state governmental units. These cases strongly suggest
that if a regime does not meaningfully interfere with a state’s police
and regulatory authority and relies on a voluntary trigger, it would be
within that constitutional limit. More generally, the fundamental
question as framed by Cardozo in Ashton and the majority in Bekins
is whether a scheme upsets the proper “balance between the powers
103
of the states and the powers of the central government,” a balance
that should be “to the advantage of the people who are citizens of
104
both.”
Although these cases provide a backdrop and reference points for
analyzing the constitutionality of a state bankruptcy regime and an
involuntary component thereof, they are probably of limited value in
that regard. As discussed below, there have been many developments

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 2, at 230.
304 U.S. 27 (1938).
Id. at 51.
Id. at 51–52.
Ashton, 298 U.S. at 542 (Cardozo, J., dissenting).
Bekins, 304 U.S. at 53.
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in relevant constitutional doctrines since the 1930s; if the municipal
bankruptcy cases provide any guidance, it will presumably be filtered
through the lens of more contemporary Tenth Amendment
jurisprudence.
B. Anti-Commandeering
One of the enduring principles of contemporary Tenth
Amendment jurisprudence is that “Congress may not simply
‘commandee[r] the legislative processes of the States by directly
compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory
105
program.’” Early cases reflecting this principle include Coyle v.
106
Smith, in which the Court held that Congress could not direct where
107
a state located its capitol. Coyle drew on prior cases articulating a
more general principle that the federal government has limited ability
108
to direct state governmental actions. The Court refined the
conceptual contours of this anti-commandeering principle in Hodel v.
109
Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association and FERC v.
110
Mississippi, cases involving the Surface Mining Control Act of 1977
and the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, respectively.
Although aspects of both Acts strongly encouraged states to take
particular regulatory actions, the Court held in each case that the act
in question did not command or compel the states to take any such
actions.
111
In New York v. United States, the Court held that provisions of
the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985
contravened the constitutional prohibition on the federal
112
government’s commandeering of state governments. That Act was
designed to encourage states to dispose of low-level radioactive waste
113
It employed three strategies:
generated within their borders.

105. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992) (quoting Hodel v. Va. Surface
Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981)).
106. 221 U.S. 559 (1911).
107. Id. at 565.
108. See generally, e.g., Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. 71 (1868); Texas v. White, 74 U.S.
700 (1868); see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905–18 (1997) (reviewing the historical
record and finding no evidence from the founding period or from early American history of
Congress enacting laws forcing state executive action).
109. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
110. 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
111. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
112. Id. at 188.
113. Id. at 150–51.
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providing a set of financial incentives for states to make arrangements
for disposal of waste, limiting access of states that did not make
satisfactory arrangements with disposal facilities in other states, and
requiring states that failed to make arrangements for waste disposal
114
by a target date to “take title” of waste generated within the state.
The Court found that the first two strategies were permissible
incentives to encourage state governmental action, but it found that
the “take title” provision effectively commandeered state
governments by forcing them to take responsibility of disposing of
115
waste generated within their borders.
116
More recently, in Printz v. United States, the Court found that
interim provisions of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act of
1993 violated the anti-commandeering doctrine under the Tenth
117
Amendment. Provisions of the Act required state law enforcement
officers to make efforts to determine within the Act’s waiting period
118
whether purchasers were allowed to possess firearms. The Court
found these provisions to be unconstitutional commandeering of state
119
executive officers.
If the involuntary bankruptcy scheme proposed above is deemed
to be commandeering, then it would likely be prohibited. But the
scheme is carefully drawn to avoid running afoul of the anticommandeering doctrine. It would not allow the federal government
to force a state to do anything other than enter bankruptcy. And this
probably cannot be construed as “commandeering” the state’s
regulatory power. The federal government would not be using the
state as an instrument for a federal regulatory agency or compelling it
to enforce a federal regulatory program; it would be imposing a legal
regime upon the state. The appropriate constitutional question, then,
is not one about commandeering but whether the federal government
has authority to impose its power upon a state in this fashion.
C. General Principles of State Sovereignty
As indicated above, the anti-commandeering doctrine derives
from a broader constitutional principle of state sovereignty reflected

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. at 152–54.
Id. at 174–77.
521 U.S. 898 (1997).
Id. at 933.
Id. at 902–04.
Id. at 933–34.
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primarily in the Tenth Amendment. The precise content of this
principle, however, is difficult to identify, especially because the
Supreme Court has charted an unsteady course in this area.
120
In National League of Cities v. Usery, the Court articulated a
121
robust doctrine of state sovereignty. In that case, the Court
considered the constitutionality of provisions of the Fair Labor
Standards Act that imposed minimum wage and maximum hour
122
regulations on state employees. Drawing upon the same line of
123
cases that supported the holding in Coyle, the Court found that the
principle of state sovereignty reflected in the Tenth Amendment
prohibited Congress from imposing such requirements on state
124
governments. It held that “insofar as the challenged amendments
operate to directly displace the States’ freedom to structure integral
operations in areas of traditional governmental functions, they are not
125
within the authority granted Congress by Art. I, s 8, cl. 3.” Quoting
Coyle, the majority opinion reasoned, “[i]f Congress may withdraw
from the States the authority to make those fundamental employment
decisions upon which their systems for performance of these
functions must rest, we think there would be little left of the States’
126
‘separate and independent existence.’”
Noteworthy for present purposes, the Court reconciled its holding
127
with that of Fry v. United States, which upheld provisions of the
Economic Stabilization Act of 1970 that imposed wage freezes on
128
state and local government employees. The general provisions of the
FLSA under attack in National League of Cities and the wage freezes
in Fry were different, the Court reasoned, because the latter was a
measured response to a national economic emergency. In
distinguishing Fry, the National League of Cities Court stated: “The
limits imposed upon the commerce power when Congress seeks to
apply it to the States are not so inflexible as to preclude temporary
129
enactments tailored to combat a national emergency.”

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

426 U.S. 833 (1976).
Id. at 849–50.
Id. at 845–46.
Id. at 844–45.
Id. at 851–52.
Id. at 851.
Id. (quoting Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 580 (1911)).
421 U.S. 542 (1975).
National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852–53.
Id. at 853 (quoting Fry, 421 U.S. at 548).

(12) FEIBELMAN (DO NOT DELETE)

112

8/20/2012 1:33 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[VOL. 7:1

The enactment at issue [in Fry] was occasioned by an extremely
serious problem which endangered the well-being of all the
component parts of our federal system and which only collective
action by the National Government might forestall. The means
selected were carefully drafted so as not to interfere with the
States’ freedom beyond a very limited, specific period of time. The
effect of the across-the-board freeze authorized by that Act,
moreover, displaced no state choices as to how governmental
operations should be structured, nor did it force the States to
remake such choices themselves. . . . Finally, the Economic
Stabilization Act operated to reduce the pressures upon state
130
budgets rather than increase them.

The limitation on Congress’s Article I powers under National
League of Cities was subsequently characterized as applying where
these four components obtained: Congress regulates “states as states”;
the statute in question touches upon matters that are “indisputably
‘attributes of state sovereignty’”; the statute impairs states’
“traditional governmental functions”; and the federal interest does
131
not “justif[y] state submission.”
Shortly thereafter, however, the Court swept aside this doctrinal
formulation and overruled National League of Cities. In Garcia v. San
132
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, the Court reconsidered the
constitutionality of the provisions of the FLSA that it had invalidated
133
in National League of Cities. Noting the difficulty lower courts were
having in assessing whether federal statutes impaired “traditional
governmental functions” under the existing doctrine, the Court
effectively reconceptualized the underlying constitutional issue at
134
hand. As the majority opinion stated, “the fact that the States
remain sovereign as to all powers not vested in Congress or denied
them by the Constitution offers no guidance about where the frontier
135
between state and federal power lies.” Thus, “we have no license to
employ freestanding conceptions of state sovereignty when measuring
136
congressional authority under the Commerce Clause.” Rather than
employ such conceptions, the Court held:
130. Id.
131. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 537 (1985) (quoting Hodel
v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 287–88 (1981)).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 536.
134. Id. at 538.
135. Id. at 550.
136. Id.

(12) FEIBELMAN (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

8/20/2012 1:33 PM

INVOLUNTARY BANKRUPTCY FOR AMERICAN STATES

113

Apart from the limitation on federal authority inherent in the
delegated nature of Congress’ Article I powers, the principal
means chosen by the Framers to ensure the role of the States in
the federal system lies in the structure of the Federal Government
itself. . . . State sovereign interests, then, are more properly
protected by procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the
federal system than by judicially created limitations on federal
137
power.

This articulation of state sovereignty has survived since Garcia. It
is noteworthy, however, that the composition of the Court has
changed since then in ways that might give reason to question the
viability of Garcia in years to come. Thus, it seems prudent to assess
the constitutionality of a provision for involuntary state bankruptcy
under both Garcia as well as National League of Cities.
Under Garcia, forcing a state into bankruptcy should not violate
the Tenth Amendment unless there is some reason to believe that the
underlying structure of the federal government has not protected the
state’s interest. If the provision were enacted pursuant to
conventional legislative procedures, it seems hard to imagine how an
objection could be framed pursuant to the concept of state
sovereignty under Garcia.
Considering the scheme in light of National League Cities presents
a much harder question. On the one hand, it is clear that forcing a
state into bankruptcy is a significant intrusion upon the state’s
sovereignty. And it would likely cause the state to experience some
financial and political disruptions. On the other hand, the National
League of Cities doctrine recognized that such an intrusion was only
138
one factor in the relevant analysis. That doctrine considered the
federal interest that occasioned treading upon states’ sovereignty and
expressly recognized that the federal government could breach state
sovereignty to avert a national emergency or address a threat to “the
139
well-being of all the component parts of our federal system.” An
involuntary bankruptcy scheme for states as modeled above would be
narrowly tailored to protect such a national interest. It would impose
upon states’ sovereignty by forcing them into bankruptcy only if they
threatened national financial or economic stability, and it would
include no other involuntary measures.
137. Id. at 550–52.
138. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
139. Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 853 (1976).
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D. Summary
The basic constitutional principle common to these three strands
of Tenth Amendment doctrine is that American states enjoy some
meaningful degree of sovereignty within our federal system, but this
degree of sovereignty is far from complete. The Constitution envisions
140
that states are only quasi-sovereign. The structure of American
government envisions, for example, that states’ power to regulate
most commercial activity is subject to federal override pursuant to the
141
Commerce Clause. The federal government controls many activities
that would be governed by fully sovereign states, including
immigration, foreign policy, defense, and monetary policy.
As explained above, a state bankruptcy regime with an
involuntary component can be designed to almost completely avoid
interfering with states’ governmental policies or functions. It is clear,
however, that the threshold involuntary component itself would be a
significant interference with a state government policy—whether to
seek bankruptcy protection. But this only begins the constitutional
analysis. Would this necessarily upset the appropriate balance of
power between the state and federal governments? If the premise of
the provision is that it could only be triggered if the state threatened
financial harm to the national government or to other states, then the
question seems to be a difficult one. The imposition on the state is
real, but it presupposes a looming national threat stemming from the
state. If one considers the real and significant dangers that a state in
acute financial crisis could pose to the nation, the case for
142
interference with state power does not seem clearly implausible. At
the very least, the issue seems close enough that the constitutional
question cannot be brushed aside, and, arguably, the burden lies with
those who would argue against allowing the federal government to
force a state into bankruptcy if that became necessary to avoid a
national crisis.

140. See Gelpern, supra note 34, at 896–925 (describing quasi-sovereigns and comparing
them to private debtors and other types of public debtors).
141. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
142. See Solan, supra note 2, at 238–40 (making a similar point with respect to allowing
states to voluntarily file for bankruptcy).
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V. CONCLUSION
Like private debtors, sovereign nations predictably delay or avoid
seeking debt relief well beyond the point that such relief would be
beneficial to them and to other stakeholders. If an American state in
financial distress behaved similarly, the costs of its delay could
substantially increase the likelihood, and the likely scope, of a federal
bailout. If so, a purely voluntary bankruptcy regime for American
states would fail to meet its primary objectives. And if the availability
of bankruptcy relief increases states’ moral hazard, a voluntary
regime could end up doing more harm than good.
If bankruptcy law is extended to American states, it should include
an involuntary component. This essay describes a minimalist model of
involuntary bankruptcy that would allow the federal government to
force a state into bankruptcy if the state is likely to need substantial
financial support or if it is threatening the nation’s financial and
economic stability. Beyond this, every other aspect of the regime as
modeled would be voluntary. A state forced into bankruptcy would
have the option to exit after a very brief period of time. If it did not
exit, it would have the ability to propose a restructuring plan that
could bind objecting holdouts without violating the Contract Clause.
The federal government might delay in forcing a state into
bankruptcy, but the availability of an involuntary trigger could at least
increase the chances of a more timely bankruptcy proceeding. This in
turn could encourage states to be more careful to avoid financial
distress ex ante and motivate other stakeholders to renegotiate their
claims ex post if a state experiences financial distress.
An involuntary bankruptcy regime designed in this fashion might
withstand constitutional scrutiny. To be sure, forcing a state into
bankruptcy would interfere with the state’s sovereignty and raise
constitutional concerns. But if the regime were otherwise voluntary,
this interference would be limited to the state’s entry into the
bankruptcy system. And, in any event, American states’ constitutional
sovereignty is qualified by existential needs of the nation. Like a
sovereign state in a monetary union, an American state would
inevitably externalize its financial distress upon the larger
governmental unit, potentially destabilizing the national economy.
Tenth Amendment doctrine allows for emergency intrusions upon
states’ sovereignty, and an involuntary state bankruptcy regime that
could be triggered only if a state is threatening the financial or
economic welfare or stability of the nation should meet this test.

